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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal design of second-best corrective regulation, when some agents
or activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian
wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies
in a large class of environments. We show that the optimal second-best policy is determined by a
subset of policy elasticities: leakage elasticities, and characterize the marginal value of relaxing
regulatory constraints. We apply our results to scenarios with unregulated agents/activities
and with uniform regulation across agents/activities. We illustrate our results in applications
to shadow banking, scale-invariant regulation, asset substitution, and fire sales.
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1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, most economies have expanded the set and
scope of regulations faced by the financial sector. This expansion has been guided by theories of
corrective policy in the presence of a diverse set of market failures, including fire-sale externalities
and distortive government subsidies (e.g., Lorenzoni, 2008; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Bianchi, 2016;
Farhi and Werning, 2016; Dávila and Korinek, 2018). However, the instruments available to
regulators remain imperfect along various dimensions. First, some imperfectly regulated institutions
— such as money market funds and asset managers — are still outside of the regulatory framework
that applies to traditional banks. Second, regulators are frequently forced to impose uniform
regulations on heterogeneous institutions and activities. For example, capital regulation is the same
across different institutions and often imposes the same risk weights on different investments within
coarse buckets. Finally, even within the regulated sector, there are imperfectly regulated activities.
Leverage and liquidity charges, for instance, are often based on ratios of assets to liabilities, leaving
the scale of each institution’s activities as a free, unregulated decision.
These imperfections are often viewed as having “unintended consequences” for regulation. For
instance, the presence of unregulated institutions may have caused leakage of activity to the
unregulated financial sector in the US and China in recent years (e.g., Adrian and Ashcraft,
2016; Hachem, 2018). Relatedly, the uniformity of regulation has led to concerns about asset
substitution, whereby institutions tilt their portfolios towards the riskier end of each regulatory
bucket. In this context, the natural normative question is how regulators should proceed once they
are aware of these consequences. This second-best policy problem appears daunting because, as we
have outlined, there are many possible market failures to consider and many seemingly disparate
imperfections in policy instruments.
This paper characterizes, for a broad class of economies, how the presence of imperfect
regulatory instruments affects the design of corrective regulation. Our goal is to identify a set
of unifying economic principles for regulation in an imperfect world. Therefore, our results build
on and complement the existing theoretical literature, which focuses on the properties of particular
types of market failures and regulatory imperfections.
We initially consider a general model in which multiple investors have access to a rich set
of investment and financing opportunities, which may induce externalities.1 A regulator can, in
principle, impose corrective Pigouvian taxes/subsidies on each investment and financing decision to
address these externalities. However, the regulator has to choose such regulations from a constrained
set. Our main characterization imposes little structure on the nature of regulatory constraints. We
show four results in this general framework before considering its various applications.
First, we characterize the marginal welfare impact of varying any given regulatory instrument.
We show that the marginal welfare effects of varying corrective regulations are determined by two
sets of statistics: i) policy elasticities and ii) Pigouvian wedges. Policy elasticities correspond to
1This model includes a general specification for possible externalities. In Section 4, we map this environment to
commonly studied market failures in a sequence of applications.
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the equilibrium responses of financing and investment decisions, both across and within investors.
Pigouvian wedges correspond to the difference between the existing corrective regulation that
directly affects a given activity and the actual marginal distortion (externality) generated by that
activity. These wedges, which can take positive or negative values, capture the extent to which
different activities are regulated too strictly or too leniently for any given set of corrective policies.
This characterization and the results that follow from it revisit and extend the classical analysis of
general second-best policy in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).2
Second, as a benchmark, we characterize the optimal first-best policy, and note that the
Pigouvian principle applies when the regulator has access to an unconstrained set of regulations.
In that case, the optimal regulation is chosen so that all Pigouvian wedges are exactly equal to
zero, with Pigouvian regulations set to equal marginal distortions. An important insight is that
policy elasticities do not form part of the first-best policy. In other words, policy elasticities are
only inherently important for corrective regulation in second-best scenarios, in which the set of
regulatory instruments is imperfect.
Third, we characterize optimal second-best policy. The second-best regulation of a given
investor’s decision is equal to the sum of i) the associated marginal distortion, guided by the first-
best Pigouvian principle, and ii) a second-best correction. We show that two sets of sufficient
statistics determine the sign of this correction and, therefore, whether an activity should be
overregulated relative to the Pigouvian principle (super-Pigouvian regulation) or underregulated
(sub-Pigouvian regulation). The first set of statistics contains the Pigouvian wedges associated
with all imperfectly regulated decisions (i.e., all decisions associated with a binding regulatory
constraint). The second is a subset of policy elasticities, which we refer to as leakage elasticities,
and which measure the responses of imperfectly regulated decisions to the changes in the regulation
of perfectly regulated decisions. Intuitively, under the second-best policy, regulators want to
discourage imperfectly regulated activities that are underregulated (with a negative Pigouvian
wedge), and encourage those that are overregulated (with a positive wedge). The leakage elasticities
measure how these activities respond to the regulator’s unconstrained policy choices. In particular,
we demonstrate that the nature of the second-best correction depends crucially on whether perfectly
and imperfectly regulated decisions are gross substitutes or gross complements. In our applications
in Section 4, we discuss natural examples of both cases.
Fourth, the last of our general results characterizes the welfare effect of relaxing regulatory
constraints. This is a relevant quantity in light of recent policy proposals that aim to extend the
scope of institution- or activity-level financial regulation (e.g., Gorton, Metrick, Shleifer and Tarullo,
2010; Adrian and Ashcraft, 2016). We decompose this welfare effect into two terms. The first is
the direct effect, which is determined by the policy elasticities of imperfectly regulated decisions
and the associated Pigouvian wedges. For example, it is most valuable to relax constraints if
2It is worth highlighting that our results apply beyond the sphere of financial regulation. Indeed, we provide a
formal counterpart of our results using classical consumer theory in Section D of the Online Appendix. However,
we have decided to focus this paper on a macro-finance environment because regulatory constraints are particularly
pervasive in this setting, since financial activity is inherently hard to regulate.
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doing so discourages activities that are severely underregulated, with large negative wedges. The
second effect features an adjustment for the responses of both perfectly and imperfectly regulated
activities in general equilibrium. Interestingly, this effect dampens the welfare benefit of relaxing
constraints, regardless of whether decisions are substitutes or complements. The logic behind this
result is reminiscent of the Le Chatelier principle (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1996), which states
that the qualitative differences between short- and long-run adjustments of a system are invariant
to whether choices are substitutes or complements.
Next, we specialize these results to characterize two classes of imperfections in detail, given
their practical relevance. First, we consider the case in which some investors or activities are
entirely unregulated. In this case, the optimal second-best regulation is given by a weighted sum
of distortions in both the regulated and unregulated segments, with the sign and magnitude of
the appropriate weights determined by the leakage elasticities. This part of our analysis bears an
interesting relationship to the well-known Tinbergen (1952) rule, and refines this rule by deriving the
optimal policy when the number of policy instruments is less than the number of targets. Second, we
consider the case of uniform regulation, where the same regulations must apply to different investors
or activities, even if they impose externalities of different magnitudes. We derive the optimal second-
best uniform regulation in a general environment, in which other (non-uniform) regulations may
remain freely adjustable. The optimal uniform regulation, which generalizes insights from Diamond
(1973), takes the form of a weighted average of distortions, once these are modified in proportion
to the Le Chatelier adjustment discussed above, which accounts for the equilibrium responses of
perfectly and imperfectly regulated decisions to each other.
Finally, to demonstrate the usefulness of these general principles, we consider four applications.
These applications show how our results can be employed in common regulatory scenarios, each with
different kinds of regulatory instruments and constraints. The applications further illustrate how
our results apply to different rationales for regulation, including bailouts, pecuniary externalities,
and behavioral models with internalities. The economic insights from our applications can be
summarized as follows:
1. Shadow Banking/Unregulated Investors: We study a model with two types of leveraged
investors, which are interpreted as regulated banks and unregulated (shadow) banks.
Regulation is imperfect in the sense that shadow banks cannot be subject to any corrective
regulation. We derive optimal second-best leverage regulation in a setting where the
government provides ex-post bailouts without commitment. We find that the optimal policy
in the regulated segment is commonly sub-Pigouvian. Concretely, the optimal policy imposes
regulations below marginal distortions whenever i) shadow banks’ leverage imposes negative
externalities, and ii) leverage choices between regulated and unregulated investors are gross
substitutes. Existing direct measurements of leakage elasticities (e.g., Irani, Iyer, Meisenzahl
and Peydro, 2021) suggest that the substitutes case is the empirically relevant one. Our results
further clarify how optimal second-best policy responds to potential changes in marginal
distortions that arise from unregulated activities in general equilibrium.
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2. Scale-Invariant Regulation/Unregulated Activities: We derive optimal policy under the
assumption that the planner can regulate investors’ leverage, i.e., the ratio of borrowing
to risky investment, but not the overall scale of investment. In this situation, regulated and
unregulated activities (e.g., leverage and the scale of risky investment) are commonly gross
complements. We consider a model in which financial regulation is motivated by a type of
internality, namely, distortions in investors’ and creditors’ beliefs about investment returns
(Dávila and Walther, 2020b). Here, we show that the optimal policy is super-Pigouvian, and
features corrective regulation that raises private marginal costs above social marginal costs.
3. Asset Substitution/Uniform Activity Regulation: We consider an environment where investors
choose between two types of risky investment, but where regulation is imperfect in that the
regulator imposes a uniform regulation across both types of investments, for example, by
imposing the same risk weights on different investments. Regulation in this application
is motivated by the fact that investors, which we once again interpret as large regulated
institutions, are too-big-to-fail and enjoy an implicit government subsidy. This case leads to
a classical asset substitution problem (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The optimal second-
best regulation is a weighted average of the downside distortions imposed by different types
of investment, with weights proportional to the policy elasticities of investment. Our general
formula also leads us to a deeper characterization of the optimal weights, which reveals that
they are closely related to the elasticity of the probability of receiving a bailout.
4. Fire-Sale Externalities with Heterogeneous Investors/Uniform Investor Regulation: Finally,
we consider an environment along the lines of Lorenzoni (2008) in which the investment
decisions of investors/entrepreneurs are associated with distributive pecuniary/fire-sale
externalities. While most of the related literature focuses on characterizing constrained-
efficient allocations, often assuming that a planner has access to investor-specific regulations,
we assume that all investors must face the same regulation. Consistent with our general
results, we show that the optimal second-best regulation is a weighted average of the
induced distortions (pecuniary externalities), which in this case are given by differences
in marginal valuations, net trade positions, and price sensitivities. This application is of
independent interest, since it shows that even when a planner does not have access to investor-
specific regulations, it may still be desirable to set corrective regulation to address pecuniary
externalities.
In each of these applications, we provide numerical illustrations of the optimal second-best policy,
and how it compares to the first-best policy. When possible, we discuss how the existing empirical
findings can be used to guide the optimal policy.
Related Literature Our paper is directly related to the literature on imperfect financial
regulation. The issue of regulatory arbitrage and shadow banking has been widely studied in recent
years. Within the theoretical literature, Plantin (2015), Farhi and Tirole (2017), Huang (2018), and
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Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2019) study the impact of capital requirements on banking activity
and financial stability. Hachem and Song (2017) explore how increased liquidity requirements
can generate credit booms when banks are heterogeneous. Grochulski and Zhang (2019) show, in
an environment in which regulation is motivated by a pecuniary externality as in Farhi, Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2009), how regulation is constrained by the presence of shadow banks. Gennaioli,
Shleifer and Vishny (2013) and Moreira and Savov (2017) develop theories that highlight the fragile
nature of shadow banking arrangements. Ordoñez (2018) shows how shadow banking enables
better-informed banks to avoid blunt regulations. Bengui and Bianchi (2018), building on Bianchi
(2011), provide a theoretical and quantitative analysis of macroprudential policy with imperfect
instruments based on a collateral pecuniary externality. Dávila and Korinek (2018) briefly discuss
the impact of specific regulatory constraints on policy in a setup with pecuniary externalities,
while Korinek (2017) provides a systematic study of optimal corrective policy in environments
with multiple regulators. Clayton and Schaab (2021) study regulatory policy in the presence of
shadow banks when there are pecuniary externalities. Begenau and Landvoigt (2021) provide a
quantitative general equilibrium assessment of regulating commercial banks for financial stability
and macroeconomic outcomes in the presence of ex-post subsidies — see also Dempsey (2020) for
a related quantitative assessment. Xiao (2020) characterizes the transmission of monetary policy
in an environment with shadow banks. One can view monetary policy as an example of uniform
corrective regulation with potentially heterogeneous responses. There is also a growing empirical
literature on regulatory arbitrage and shadow banking, which includes the work of Acharya, Schnabl
and Suarez (2013), Demyanyk and Loutskina (2016), and Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski and Seru
(2018a,b), among others.
Methodologically, our approach develops a sufficient statistic approach to account for imperfect
regulation. Related work in the context of credit markets, banking, and financial intermediation
includes Matvos (2013), who uses sufficient statistics to estimate the benefits of contractual
completeness; Dávila (2020), who studies the optimal determination of bankruptcy exemptions;
Sraer and Thesmar (2018), who show how to produce aggregate estimates from individual firm’s
experiments; Dávila and Goldstein (2018), who explore the determination of deposit insurance; and
Van den Heuvel (2018), who studies the welfare effects of bank liquidity and capital requirements.
At a broader level, our results are connected to the public economics literature that deals with
imperfect corrective regulation. Along this dimension, we contribute by showing that several classic
results can be obtained and expanded using a common set of equations. For instance, the imperfect
corrective taxes derived in Diamond (1973) are seemingly distinct from the characterization of
second-best policy in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), but both can be derived as special cases from
Proposition 1 in this paper. Other contributions in this literature, often focused on whether indirect
regulation is effective or even more desirable than direct regulation, include Baumol (1972), Sandmo
(1975), Green and Sheshinski (1976), Balcer (1980), Wijkander (1985), and Cremer, Gahvari and
Ladoux (1998) — see also the textbook treatment of Salanié (2011) and the lecture notes of Werning
(2012).
Our results are also related to Hendren (2016), from whom we adopt the terminology “policy
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elasticity”. We identify the special role that a subset of policy elasticities, leakage elasticities, play
when studying second-best regulation. Finally, second-best corrective regulation is often discussed
in the context of environmental policy and congestion — see Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) for a
comprehensive review of that literature — as well as rent-seeking. Rothschild and Scheuer (2014,
2016) study optimal taxation with both corrective and redistributive motives in environments with
rent-seeking, highlighting the importance of general equilibrium effects.
Outline The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our general framework and
characterizes its equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes the general marginal effects that determine
the optimal regulation and presents their implications for optimal regulation. Section 4 provides
concrete illustrations of the general results in a set of tractable applications. Section 5 concludes.
All proofs and derivations are in the Appendix.
2 General Framework
This section lays out our general framework, which is general enough to capture a wide range of
scenarios, but sufficiently tractable to yield precise insights and highlight the channels at work.
We consider an environment in which a group of agents (investors) make multiple financing and
investment decisions that can be subject to a potentially rich set of regulations.
In this section, we assume that the decisions made by an investor directly induce externalities on
others, providing a rationale for corrective regulation. In Section 4, we provide concrete illustrations
of our results in a set of tractable applications. These applications illustrate how our general
formulation encompasses widely studied rationales for regulation, including bailouts, pecuniary
externalities, and internalities.
2.1 Environment
There are two dates t ∈ {0, 1} and a single consumption good (dollar), which serves as numeraire.
At date 1, there is a continuum of possible states of nature s ∈ [s, s]. The state s is a random
variable with cumulative distribution function F (s).
There are two sets of agents: investors and creditors. There is a finite number of investor
types (investors, for short), with each type in unit measure and indexed by i, j, ` ∈ I, where
I = {1, 2, . . . , |I|}.3 There is a unit measure of representative/identical creditors, indexed by C.
Finally, there is also a social planner/regulator/government, who sets regulatory policy.
At date 0, investors have access to a set of financing opportunities, given by B = {1, 2, . . . , |B|},
and a set of investment opportunities, given by K = {1, 2, . . . , |K|}. We denote the financing and
investment choices of investor i by bi ∈ R|B|+ and ki ∈ R
|K|
+ , respectively. We often collect the
3The notion of investor used in this paper is meant to be understood broadly. We could have referred to investors
as financial intermediaries, experts, or entrepreneurs.
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When needed, we denote the set of balance-sheet opportunities by X = B ∪ K, so |X | = |B| + |K|
and xi ∈ R|X |+ .
At date 1, once s is realized, investors receive the return on their investments and pay back
(fully or partially) their financial obligations. Creditors provide financing to investors at date 0
and receive (full or partial) repayments from investors at date 1. We define these repayments in
detail below.















where ui (·) is a function of ci0 and ci1 (s), which denote the consumption of investor i at date 0 and
at date 1 in state s, respectively, as well as xj , which denotes the balance-sheet choices of type j
investors as a whole. In equilibrium, as explained below, it will be the case that xj = xj , ∀j ∈ I.
Importantly, by virtue of being infinitesimal, an individual type i investor does not account for the
impact on xi when choosing xi.
Investor i faces the following budget constraints:








− τ i · xi + T i0 (2)





where we use · to denote the inner product between two vectors. At date 0, investor i is initially





determination in equilibrium is described below. Investor i makes balance-sheet (financing and




∈ R|X |+ . Moreover, the balance-sheet decisions




≥ 0. This term can capture technological
adjustment costs associated with investing or other costs associated with making financing choices.
Importantly, in principle, each investor faces investor-specific taxes/subsidies on balance-sheet
decisions, via the vector τ i ∈ R|X |, ∀i. Regulating bi can be interpreted as setting liability-side
regulation, while regulating ki can be interpreted as setting asset-side regulation. In Section 3,
our main results consider alternative regulatory scenarios by imposing constraints on τ i. Finally,
investor i receives a lump-sum transfer T i0 ≥ 0 at date 0, as described below.
At date 1, investor i is endowed with ni1 (s) dollars when state s is realized. We denote the
final return on the investments of investor i in state s, net of any financial obligations contained




. As shown in the Appendix, this general formulation of ρi (·)
can accommodate the possibility of default by investors, as we also illustrate in our applications.
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where uC (·) is a function of cC0 and cC1 (s), which denote the consumption of creditors at date 0
and at date 1 in state s, respectively, as well as xj , which denotes the balance-sheet choices of type
j investors as a whole.
Creditors face the following budget constraints:



















At date 0, creditors are initially endowed with nC0 dollars. They choose to fund a share hCi of each
investor i’s financing needs Qi (·), although, in equilibrium, hCi = 1, as we explain below. At date 1,




from investor i. As we show in the Appendix and illustrate through our applications, this general
formulation of ρCi (·) can accommodate deadweight losses associated with the possibility of default
by investors.
Regulation. As explained when introducing the investors’ problem, the regulator has access to
investor-specific taxes/subsidies on all balance-sheet decisions. Formally, the regulator controls the


















where τ in denotes the regulation that directly affects the balance-sheet decision n of investor i.










τ i · xi. (8)
Our results are valid for any set of lump-sum transfers that satisfies Equation (8).4
The main focus of this paper is on situations where there are constraints on the set of instruments
4Models of corrective regulation sometimes impose that T i0 = τ i · xi, ∀i, which implies that any revenue raised
from type i investors is returned to themselves. Equation (8) is trivially satisfied when this more restrictive condition
holds. In that case, our results can also be interpreted as a form of quantity regulation.
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available to the regulator. We flexibly model those possible constraints by assuming that the
regulator chooses taxes/subsidies subject to M ≥ 0 predetermined constraints, which we write as
Φ (τ ) ≤ 0,
where the vector-valued function Φ : R|X ||I| → RM defines the set of feasible regulations. This
general specification captures several regulatory scenarios. For instance, when Φ (·) ≡ 0, then the
regulator is unconstrained and can achieve the first-best policy, which we characterize in Section
3.3. Alternatively, we also consider second-best scenarios in which the regulator i) only regulates
the activities of a particular subset of investors, ii) only regulates a specific subset of activities, or
iii) faces constraints on the level that the regulation on investors or activities can take.





























































default decisions such that i) investors maximize utility, Equation (1), subject to budget constraints
(2) and (3); ii) creditors maximize utility, Equation (4), subject to budget constraints (5) and (6);
iii) any revenue raised is returned back to investors, satisfying Equation (8); iv) financing decisions
satisfy market clearing, that is, hCi = 1, ∀i; and v) investors’ balance-sheet decisions are consistent
in the aggregate, that is, xi = xi, ∀i.
Our notion of equilibrium, in which investors internalize that their balance-sheet decisions
can affect the payoffs of creditors in equilibrium, is standard in models that allow for default
(e.g., Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik, 2005; Aguiar and Amador, 2013; Livshits, 2015). Until
we introduce our applications in Section 4, we proceed as if the environment considered here is
well-behaved. We discuss the necessary regularity conditions for this to be the case within each of
our applications.
Remarks. Before characterizing the equilibrium of the model, we conclude the description of the
environment with four remarks.
First, assuming that the utility functions of investors or creditors depend directly on the choices
of others — in Equations (1) and (4) — immediately justifies the desirability of corrective regulation.
Given that the main insights of this paper do not rely on the exact rationale behind the corrective
regulation, we adopt this formulation since it is the simplest. In Section 4, we show how our
formulation encompasses widely studied rationales for regulation, including bailouts, pecuniary
externalities, and internalities.
Second, note that we model investors and creditors as distinct groups of agents mostly for
tractability. One can interpret creditors in our model as a type of investor who is only allowed to
fund other investors, and does so without generating welfare-relevant externalities. Therefore, as
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we show in Section 3.3, it is sufficient to regulate the balance-sheet decisions of investors to reach
the first-best outcome of the model.5
Third, note that our environment, which allows for both complete and incomplete markets and
can accommodate default, is quite general. Moreover, in Section D of the Online Appendix, we
provide a formal counterpart of our results using classical consumer theory.
Finally, note that by suitably interpreting the utility of creditors, our model captures non-
pecuniary benefits that may accrue to creditors from some particular form of financing. For
instance, the liabilities of some investors are often seen as special, featuring a convenience yield,
which is fully consistent with our framework — see, in related contexts, Stein (2012), Sunderam
(2015), or Begenau and Landvoigt (2021).
2.2 Equilibrium characterization
For given corrective taxes/subsidies and lump-sum transfers, we now succinctly characterize the
equilibrium conditions of the model. First, we present the optimality conditions associated with











dF (s) , ∀i, (9)
where mC (s) denotes the creditors’ stochastic discount factor. Equation (9), which is an Euler
equation for creditors, will determine the financing conditions that investors face. Note that the
creditors’ stochastic discount factor mC (s) is an equilibrium object, which depends on the choices
of all investors in the model and the regulatory policy. Hence, regulating an investor j impacts




, via changes in creditors’ stochastic
discount factor.
Next, we present the optimality conditions associated with investors’ optimal balance-sheet




















dF (s) , ∀i, (10)
where mi (s) denotes the stochastic discount factor of investor i. Note that Equation (10)
represents the |X | optimality conditions that determine the optimal balance-sheet of investors.
These conditions are Euler equations for both financing and investment. Given Equations (9) and
(10), which fully characterize the equilibrium of the model once xi = xi, we can now study the
optimal corrective regulation.
5In an earlier version of this paper, we allowed for investors to invest in each other’s liabilities and for creditors’
decisions to also be associated with welfare-relevant externalities. Since the main insights are identical in both
formulations, we adopt the current formulation since it substantially simplifies the notation.
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3 Optimal Corrective Regulation
In this section, which contains the main contributions of this paper, we study the problem of a
planner who can set the optimal corrective regulation under different constraints on the set of
regulatory instruments τ . First, we provide a general characterization of the marginal welfare
effect of adjusting corrective regulation. Subsequently, we characterize the optimal first-best and
second-best regulations. In Subsection 3.1, we preemptively introduce the notation and definitions
necessary to formulate our results.
3.1 Notation and definitions
We denote by
{
V i (τ )
}
i∈I and V
C (τ ) the indirect utilities of investors and creditors, respectively,
as a function of the full set of regulatory instruments τ ∈ R|X ||I|. In order to abstract from
redistributional concerns and focus on the corrective nature of the regulation, we assess the
aggregate welfare gains/losses of a marginal change in regulation by aggregating money-metric
utility changes across all agents.6
Formally, we express the change in social welfare induced by a marginal change in a given






















dz /λC0 denote the money-metric change in indirect utility for
investors and creditors, respectively, and where λi0 and λC0 denote the marginal value of a dollar at
date 0 for investors and creditors.7 In particular, we will characterize the marginal welfare effect


























and where dWdτ ∈ R
|X ||I| and dW
dτ j
∈ R|X |. Each element of dW
dτ j
denotes the marginal welfare effect
of varying the regulation that investor j faces. By vertically stacking dW
dτ j
, we collect the set of
marginal welfare effects associated with varying each of the elements of τ in the vector dWdτ
6This approach can be interpreted as selecting an equal-weighted set of “generalized social marginal welfare
weights,” using the approach in Saez and Stantcheva (2016). It is straightforward to allow for traditional social
welfare weights in our framework.
















. The sub-index m stands
for money-metric.
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We also define the vectors of investors’ balance-sheets x ∈ R|X ||I| and marginal



































where xin denotes the balance-sheet decision n of investor i and δin corresponds to the money-metric













We define the square Jacobian matrix of investors’ balance-sheets x with respect to τ , of dimension














· · · dx|I|
dτ |I|























denotes how the balance-sheet decision n of investor i changes when regulating the
balance-sheet decision n′ of investor j. Following Hendren (2016), we refer to the elements of dxdτ ,
which represent the equilibrium responses of balance-sheets x to changes in regulation τ , as policy
elasticities.
Finally, we define Pigouvian wedges ω ∈ R|X ||I| between corrective regulations τ and marginal
distortions δ as follows:
ω = τ − δ. (16)
As we show in Proposition 2, Pigouvian wedges are zero at the first-best, so they define the distance
between a given set of regulations and the first-best regulation. Outside of the first-best, Pigouvian
wedges can be positive or negative. If a wedge ωin is positive, the balance-sheet decision n of investor
i is overregulated, in the sense that it is welfare-improving to increase the level of the associated xin.
Alternatively, if a wedge ωin is negative, the balance-sheet decision n of investor i is underregulated,
in the sense that it is welfare-improving to reduce the level of the associated xin. Therefore, we say






is negative, making δin positive. An






is positive, making δin negative.
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that:
ωin > 0⇒ Overregulation
(
increasing xin is welfare-improving
)
ωin < 0⇒ Underregulation
(
decreasing xin is welfare-improving
)
.
Our results below demonstrate that both over and underregulation can arise as part of the optimal
second-best policy, depending on the nature of the constraints faced by the planner.
3.2 Marginal welfare effects of corrective regulation
Given these definitions, we are ready to present Proposition 1, which characterizes the marginal
welfare effects of varying the set of balance-sheet regulations, dWdτ . Proposition 1 highlights that
dW
dτ can be exclusively characterized in terms of two sets of sufficient statistics: policy elasticities
and Pigouvian wedges.
Proposition 1. [Marginal Welfare Effects of Corrective Regulation: Policy Elasticities and
Pigouvian Wedges] The marginal welfare effects of varying the set of balance-sheet regulations τ ,
dW





(τ − δ) = dx
dτ
ω, (17)
where dWdτ is a vector of dimension |X | |I| × 1, defined in Equation (12);
dx
dτ is the square Jacobian
matrix of policy elasticities of dimension |X | |I|×|X | |I|, defined in Equation (15); and τ and δ are
vectors of dimension |X | |I|×1, where the vector of regulations τ is defined in Equation (7) and the
vector of marginal distortions δ is defined in Equation (13). Therefore, the marginal welfare effects
dW
dτ can be exclusively characterized in terms of two sets of sufficient statistics: policy elasticities,
dx
dτ , and Pigouvian wedges, ω.
9
Proposition 1 shows that in order to characterize the welfare impact of any change in regulation
it is sufficient to understand i) how the balance-sheet decisions of all investors react in equilibrium
to such a change, via the matrix of policy elasticities, and ii) the size of the marginal uncorrected
externalities associated with each individual balance-sheet decisions, via the vector of Pigouvian
wedges.10
The first set of sufficient statistics are the policy elasticities, dxdτ , defined in Equation (15),
which capture the general equilibrium responses of the balance-sheet decisions of investor i to
9Note that Equation (17) implies that the marginal welfare effects of varying the balance-sheet regulations that


















τ in − δin
)
.
10Note that the planner accounts for the welfare impact of policy changes on equilibrium prices. As we show in
the Appendix, the impact of changes in equilibrium prices is zero-sum on aggregate. Using the language of Dávila
















relevant. Equation (17) implies that, for a given Pigouvian wedge, whether balance-sheet activities
are gross substitutes ( dxi
dτ j
> 0) or gross complements ( dxi
dτ j
< 0) becomes critical to determine the
welfare impact of policy changes. The substitutes/complements distinction is central to the design
of optimal second-best regulation.
The second set of sufficient statistics are the Pigouvian wedges between corrective
taxes/subsidies and marginal distortions. For any given set of regulations, these wedges capture
the extent to which different balance-sheet activities are regulated too strictly or too leniently. For
example, if ωin = τ in − δin < (>) 0, then the corrective regulation on the balance-sheet activity n
of investor i is smaller (larger) than the marginal distortion that this activity creates. Therefore,
negative wedges imply that the private marginal cost of an activity is smaller than social marginal
cost, while positive wedges imply that the private marginal cost exceeds the social marginal cost.
Moreover, Equation (17) shows that the marginal welfare effects of any regulatory change can
be interpreted as a linear transformation of wedges, with the matrix dxdτ of policy elasticities acting
as a transformation matrix.11 Intuitively, welfare will increase if a policy reform discourages




< (>) 0, that are currently regulated too leniently (strongly),
e.g., ωin < (>) 0, or vice versa. The overall marginal welfare effect corresponds to adding up over
the products of leakage elasticities and Pigouvian wedges.
The marginal welfare effects presented in Proposition 1 are useful to characterize the form of
the optimal regulation in alternative regulatory scenarios. In the remainder of this section, we show
how to employ Proposition 1 to characterize the optimal first-best and second-best regulations.
3.3 First-best regulation: Benchmark
Under the first-best regulation, a planner is allowed to set arbitrary corrective regulations τ ∈
R|X ||I| for all investors. In that case, Proposition 2 provides a well-known characterization of the
first-best policy, which provides a benchmark against which we evaluate the optimal second-best
policy.
Proposition 2. [First-Best Regulation/Pigouvian Principle] If the planner can freely regulate all
investors without constraints, and the matrix of policy elasticities has full rank, then the first-best
regulation satisfies:
ω = 0 ⇐⇒ τ ? = δ.
Therefore, the first-best regulation does not depend directly on the magnitude of the policy
elasticities.
This is an instance of the Pigouvian principle, i.e., the “polluter pays” (Pigou, 1920; Sandmo,
11If T (·) is a linear transformation mapping Rn to Rm and x ∈ Rn is a column vector, then T (x) = Ax for some
m× n matrix A, which is called the transformation matrix of T (·).
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1975). The first-best regulation on investors is set to perfectly align private and social incentives
across every activity undertaken by each agent. In terms of the Pigouvian wedges defined in
Equation (16), the optimal regulation is such that all wedges are set to zero. Proposition 2 directly
implies that an economy without externalities, i.e., one for which ∂uj
∂xin
= 0 and ∂uC
∂xin
= 0, ∀i, j ∈ I,
is efficient.
An important consequence of Proposition 2 is that the first-best regulation does not directly
depend on the magnitude of the policy elasticities. It is exclusively a function of the Pigouvian
wedges. Intuitively, the first-best regulation must satisfy dWdτ =
dx
dτω = 0, which defines a system
of homogeneous linear equations in ω. If the matrix of policy elasticities dxdτ is invertible (i.e., has
full rank), the only solution to this system is the trivial solution, in which ω = 0 and τ ? = δ.
Importantly, while Proposition 2 characterizes the optimal first-best regulation, it does not
provide a solution in terms of primitives unless the marginal distortions δ are invariant to the
level of regulation (this will be the case in several of our applications). Whenever the marginal
distortions are endogenous to the level of the regulation, our claims here become statements about
the form of the optimal policy formulas. The same caveat applies to our discussions of Propositions
3 through 4.
3.4 Second-best regulation
Now we consider scenarios in which the planner faces a set of predetermined constraints on the
set of instruments τ , providing a novel general characterization of the optimal second-best policy.
Formally, the optimal second-best policy is given by
τ ?? = arg max
τ
W (τ )
s.t. Φ (τ ) ≤ 0,
where the vector-valued function Φ (·) : R|X ||I| → RM defines a set of M ≥ 0 constraints on the
set of instruments τ . This general specification of Φ (·) allows us to consider a wide range of
regulatory constraints. For instance, when the planner cannot regulate agent j, the appropriate
constraints are τ jn = 0, ∀n ∈ X . Similarly, when the planner cannot regulate a particular activity
n, the appropriate constraints are τ in = 0, ∀i ∈ I. Alternatively, when all agents are regulated at
the same rate or when all activities are regulated at the same rate, the appropriate constraints are
τ in = τn, ∀i ∈ I, or τ in = τ i, ∀n ∈ X , respectively. Many other scenarios of practical relevance can
be interpreted as combinations of these.





µ = 0, (18)
where dΦdτ denotes the Jacobian of the constraints — a matrix of dimension |X | |I| ×M — and
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At this point, we make a distinction between i) perfectly regulated decisions and ii) imperfectly
regulated decisions. We say that a balance-sheet decision of a given investor is perfectly regulated
when all constraints associated with that decision are slack, and imperfectly regulated when its
regulation is subject to a binding constraint. Formally, we denote the mutually exclusive sets of
perfectly regulated (R) and imperfectly regulated (U) decisions by12
R =
{





(j, n) : j ∈ I, n ∈ X , ηjn 6= 0
}
⇒ Imperfectly Regulated,




The vector η quantifies, for each regulatory instrument in τ , the shadow cost of increasing the
regulation associated with the regulatory constraints. Notice that, because we have a general
specification of constraints, the shadow costs in η can be negative. For example, if one of the
constraints embedded in Φ (τ ) imposes a binding lower bound on a tax/subsidy τ jn, then the
corresponding shadow cost is ηjn < 0. It is important not to confuse this property of η with the
Lagrange multipliers µ, which must be non-negative.





















. The Jacobian matrix dxdτ of policy elasticities, introduced in









as described in the Appendix. For the remainder of this section, we will assume that the matrices





In this paper, we introduce the notion of leakage elasticities to refer to the elements of the
Jacobian matrix dxU
dτR
, which capture the responses of imperfectly regulated decisions to changes
in regulation. In Proposition 3, we show that leakage elasticities are a key determinant of the
second-best policy.
Proposition 3. [Second-Best Regulation: General Case] The optimal second-best regulation
12We choose U to denote the set of imperfectly regulated decisions since “unregulated” decisions are a leading case
of imperfectly regulated decisions.
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satisfies













are Jacobian matrices of
dimension |R|× |R| and |R|× |U|, respectively, and ωU = τU −δU is a vector of Pigouvian wedges
of dimension |U|×1. Therefore, the optimal second-best regulation only depends directly on a subset





Proposition 3 provides direct insights into the form of the optimal second-best policy. Since the
first-best solution is given by τR = δR, whether the optimal second-best policy overregulates or







ωU , which we
refer to as the second-best correction.13 First, we provide a heuristic interpretation of the general
characterization in Equation (19), which explains the most relevant economic effects. Next, we
provide formal insights in the context of two illustrative examples.
At a heuristic level, as long as perfectly regulated activities decrease when their regulation
is tightened (dxR
dτR
is “negative”), the sign of the second-best correction becomes a product of
the leakage elasticities and the Pigouvian wedges of imperfectly regulated choices. Under the
natural presumption that the constraints are such that imperfectly regulated activities are indeed
underregulated (τU < δU or, equivalently, ωU < 0), whether the optimal second-best policy
overregulates or underregulates an activity becomes a function of whether such an activity is a
gross substitute or a gross complement with respect to imperfectly regulated decisions. Therefore,
it is optimal to underregulate the regulated relative to the first-best (ωR < 0), when regulated
and unregulated are gross substitutes (dxU
dτR
> 0). Alternatively, it is optimal to overregulate the
regulated relative to the first-best (ωR > 0) when regulated and unregulated are gross complements
(dxU
dτR
< 0). Indeed, our applications below demonstrate that both gross substitutes and gross
complements are common in standard scenarios, depending on which activities are imperfectly
regulated.
To provide formal insights, it is useful to study two special cases. First, we consider a scenario
in which there is a single fully regulated decision. Second, we consider a scenario in which the
responses of perfectly regulated activities to changes in regulation are independent of one another.
In both cases, the formulas for second-best regulation simplify because we do not have to account
for the responses of different regulated activities on one another.
Example 1. [Single Decision] Consider the simple scenario in which there are two investors |I| = 2,
and each investor has a single decision |X | = 1. Assume that only investor 1 can be regulated, with
regulatory constraints dictating that τ2 ≡ 0. In that case, it follows from Proposition 3 that the
13As explained when describing the first-best regulation, Equation (19) does not characterize the optimal second-




is invariant to the level
of regulation, any statement on whether the second-best policy overregulates or underregulates a decision relative to
the first-best is an exact directional statement — this will be the case in several of our applications. Whenever the
marginal distortions are endogenous to the level of the regulation, our claims here become statements about the form
of the optimal policy formulas.
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optimal regulation for the regulated is simply given by









This case clearly shows the relationships discussed above. The optimal regulation on investor
type 1 is equal to the first-best equivalent δ1 plus a weighted sum of the distortion imposed by
the other unregulated agent. Assume, for instance, that the distortion by the unregulated agent
satisfies δ2 > 0. The weight on the distortion by the unregulated agent is negative, implying
that it pushes τ1 towards underregulation, whenever i) the regulated agent responds negatively
to increased regulation (the “regular” case with dx1
dτ1 < 0), and ii) the associated leakage elasticity
indicates gross substitutes with dx2
dτ1 > 0.
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Example 2. [Diagonal Case] Assume that dxR
dτR
is a diagonal matrix. Then, the second-best
regulation on choice (j, n) ∈ R is















The simplified formula again shows the importance of leakage elasticities, which are weighted by
wedges and summed across all unregulated activities (j′, n′) ∈ U . It is clear in this case that it is
optimal to underregulate the regulated (τ jn < δjn) if each of the imperfectly regulated activities is
underregulated (ωj
′





> 0). In addition,
the formula shows that, even when not every activity satisfies gross substitutes, it is optimal to
underregulate the regulated when a weighted average of leakage elasticities — with the weights
proportional to the associated wedges — is positive.
We conclude with a remark explaining how our characterization of the optimal second-best
policy relates to the classic results in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
Remark 1. [Connection to Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)] Equation (19) immediately implies that
ωR 6= 0 as long as ωU 6= 0 and dxU
dτR
6= 0. This insight is related to the discussion of second-best
policy in Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), who show that price distortions for one good imply optimal
distortions in other goods in the context of second-best tariff and monopoly regulation. The results
of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) are often perceived as implying that there is little structure to
the problem of the second-best.15 While it is true that over and underregulation relative to the
14While this is the simplest example for building intuition, note that the same insight extends to any economy
with a single regulated decision R = {(j′, n′)}, and with an arbitrary set of unregulated decisions U for which
taxes/subsidies are forced to be zero. In this more general example, the optimal policy formula becomes











15Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) explicitly write:
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first-best are possible, our results show that there is significant structure on how the optimal second-
best regulation must be conducted. Our formal general results show that leakage elasticities, and
through these elasticities whether particular decisions are gross complements or substitutes, are
critical to determine the optimal second-best regulation. Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) are also
often credited with the insight that social welfare can decrease when relaxing a constraint. We
revisit this argument after Proposition 4, which comes next and characterizes the welfare effects of
relaxing regulatory constraints.
3.5 Welfare effects of relaxing regulatory constraints
We now characterize the marginal welfare impact of relaxing regulatory constraints or, equivalently,
the shadow value of regulating imperfectly regulated choices xU . Formally, Proposition 4 evaluates
the marginal welfare effects of hypothetical (i.e., unconstrained) adjustments to the constrained
taxes/subsidies τU under the optimal second-best regulation.
Proposition 4. [Welfare effects of relaxing regulatory constraints] The marginal welfare effects of







(I −L)ωU , (21)
where dxU
dτU
is a Jacobian matrix of dimension |U| × |U|, I is the identity matrix of dimension















and where ωU = τU − δU is a vector of dimension |U| × 1.
Equation (21) decomposes the value of regulating xU into two parts. First, we have the
direct effect of adjusting τU , which would prevail in a scenario where all decisions are imperfectly
regulated. By Proposition 1, this quantity is equal to the product dxU
dτU
ωU of policy elasticities and
wedges on all imperfectly regulated decisions.
Second, the equation makes an adjustment for the indirect policy effect, that is, for the
responses of perfectly regulated decisions xR. The appropriate adjustment is given by −dxU
dτU
LωU .
Interestingly, this adjustment tends to reduce the welfare effect of regulating the imperfectly
regulated, regardless of whether unregulated and regulated choices are substitutes or complements.
To illustrate this effect most clearly, we revisit the simple case from Example 1:
Example 3. [Single Decision, cont.] Assume, as in Example 1, that there are two agents, each of
whom makes a single decision, and only agent 1 is regulated, with τ2 = 0. Then, substituting the
“It is important to note that in general, nothing can be said about the direction or the magnitude of the
secondary departures from optimum conditions made necessary by the original non-fulfillment of one
condition”.
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To interpret this expression, assume that the distortion δ2 > 0, and that we are in the “regular”
case where the own-regulatory responses are negative with dx1
dτ1 < 0 and
dx2
dτ2 < 0. First, consider
the substitutes case, in which dx2
dτ1 < 0 and
dx1
dτ2 < 0. We have L > 0, so that the welfare gain
from increasing τ2 is smaller than it would be in the absence of an indirect effect on agent type
1. Intuitively, regulating the unregulated pushes distorted activity back to the regulated sector,
which dampens the direct welfare gains. Second, consider the complements case, in which dx2
dτ1 > 0
and dx1
dτ2 > 0. Once again, we have L > 0. This result arises from the nature of the second-best
regulation of agent type 1, which in the case of complements involves overregulation (ω1 > 0; see
Example 1). Raising τ2 in this scenario reduces the activity of agent 1 which, due to the initial
overregulation, dampens the associated welfare benefit.16
Notice that Proposition 4 generalizes this reasoning to the case with multiple decisions.














> 0), implying once
again that the welfare effect of regulating the imperfectly regulated choices xU is dampened. These
insights bear a connection to the Le Chatelier principle, which we discuss in the following remark.
Remark 2. [Connection to Le Chatelier Principle (Samuelson, 1948; Milgrom and Roberts, 1996)]
A prominent result in economic theory in which either complementarity or substitutability plays
the same role is the Le Chatelier Principle. In its simplest form, it states that whenever choices are
either complements or substitutes, the long-run response of a system is larger than its short-term
response — see Milgrom and Roberts (1996) for a modern treatment. Note that Proposition 4
has a similar flavor, but it actually has the opposite conclusions in welfare terms: when we let our
system adjust further via the implementation of the optimal second-best policy, the shadow welfare
gains from regulation are lower.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, starting from the second-best, the planner does not always
wish to push regulations for imperfectly regulated choices towards their first-best value. As noted
above in our discussion of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), even when dxU
dτU
ωU > 0, it is possible that
dW
dτU
< 0, showing that loosening some regulation can be welfare-decreasing in our environment.
16Note that it is conceivable to construct environments in which decisions are neither complements nor substitutes.




dτ1 having opposite signs. Our characterization also applies to
these cases, which are rare in common economic applications — see the related discussion in Milgrom and Roberts
(1996).
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3.6 Common Scenarios of Regulatory Constraints
Finally, before illustrating our general results in the context of the applications, we specialize our
results in the case of two common scenarios of regulatory constraints. First, we consider the case
in which some investors or activities cannot be regulated at all. Second, we consider the case in
which the same corrective regulation must apply to all activities and/or investors.
3.6.1 Unregulated investors/activities
A particular type of regulatory constraint that is highly relevant in practice is when some investors
or activities cannot be regulated at all. Formally, here we assume that the planner faces a constraint
of the form
Φ (τ ) = τU = 0,
so a subset of investors/activities are not subject to regulation at all.17 In that case, a specialized
version of Equation (19) applies.
Proposition 5. [Second-Best Regulation: Unregulated Investors/Activities] When some investors
and/or activities cannot be regulated at all, i.e., Φ (τ ) = τU = 0, the optimal second-best regulation
satisfies













are Jacobian matrices of dimensions |R| × |R| and |R| × |U|, respectively.
As in Proposition 3, whether the regulated and unregulated decisions are gross complements or
substitutes is critical for the determination of the optimal second-best policy. In the case in which
some activities are unregulated, ωU = −δU , so the planner only relies on the value of the distortion
of the unregulated δU , instead of the value of the Pigouvian wedge of the unregulated.
Remark 3. [Connection to the Tinbergen (1952) rule] Proposition 5 relates to the classical analysis
of policy instruments in Tinbergen (1952). The Tinbergen (1952) rule states that first-best policy
must have access to as many instruments as it has targets. A concordant interpretation of Equation
(23) is that a second-best planner must use the |R| instruments contained in the free taxes/subsidies
τR (on the left-hand side of the equation) to target |R|+ |U| distortions contained in δR and δU (on
the right-hand side). It is immediate from the equation that first-best cannot be achieved unless
δU = 0, consistent with the Tinbergen rule. The characterization of second-best regulation in the
equation offers a further refinement of the Tinbergen rule: with insufficient policy instruments, the
optimal tax/subsidy equals a weighted sum of all distortions in the economy, whose weights are
linked directly to leakage elasticities.
17Slightly more generally, one could consider the case in which Φ (τ ) = τU − τU = 0, so same regulations are fixed
at a predetermined value τU .
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3.6.2 Uniform regulation
A second type of regulatory constraints that is highly relevant in practice is when the same corrective
regulation must apply to all activities and/or investors, despite the fact that each activity and/or
investor may be associated with externalities of different magnitudes. Formally, here we assume
that the planner is forced to set the same regulation for a subset U of choices, that is, the planner
faces constraints of the following form:18
τ jn = τ
j′
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We say that in this case the planner’s regulation is imperfectly targeted. In Proposition 6, we show
that Equation (19) can be specialized to conclude that second-best policy is given by a weighted
average of distortions.
Proposition 6. [Second-Best Regulation: Imperfect Targeting] When some investors and/or
activities must be regulated at the same rate, i.e., τ jn = τ
j′
n′ , ∀ (j, n) , (j′, n′) ∈ U , the optimal second-
best regulation satisfies









, ∀ (j, n) ∈ U , (24)
where ι is a vector of ones with dimension |U|×1, dxU
dτU
is a Jacobian matrix of dimension |U|× |U|,















Unlike our previous characterizations, Proposition 6 provides an explicit formula for
taxes/subsidies on imperfectly regulated activities, leveraging the special case where regulation
must be uniform on a subset of activities. Equation (24) demonstrates that the optimal second-
best uniform regulation τU is a weighted average of the distortions δU generated by the associated
activities. Notice that, if distortions are symmetric across activities with δU = ιδ , then Equation
(24) implies that the planner should set the first-best regulation τU = δ̄. However, if there is any
18Note that all choices in U will be generically associated with a binding constraint, so this notation is consistent
with the way we introduced the set U .
23
asymmetry, the first-best cannot be achieved with uniform regulation.
To build further intuition for this result, it is useful to first consider the special case where all
activities are subject to uniform regulation (xU = x). In that case, it follows from Proposition 6




























This optimal regulation is a weighted average of distortions generated by imperfectly regulated
activities, and the weights are equal to the total policy elasticities of each activity. Intuitively, the
optimal regulation is large when activities with large (positive) distortions are most responsive to
uniform regulation.
Equation (24) generalizes this idea to the case where there may also be perfectly regulated
activities xR, on which the planner can set regulation freely, in addition to the uniformly regulated
activities xU . In the general case, the optimal weights are adjusted for the endogenous responses
of perfectly regulated activities xR. Interestingly, the necessary adjustment is captured by the
same matrix L that features in the value of relaxing regulatory constraints in Proposition 4. In
the special case where either dxR
dτU
= 0 or dxU
dτR
= 0, we have L = 0, and we recover the expression in
Equation (25).
We close this section by relating these results to the classical analysis of uniform corrective
taxation in Diamond (1973):
Remark 4. [Connection to Diamond (1973)] The insight that uniform regulation of heterogeneous
externalities is given by a weighted average of the distortions can be traced back to Diamond
(1973). Indeed, the special case where all activities are subject to uniform regulation in our
model yields Equation (25), which corresponds to Diamond’s result that the optimal weights on
different distortions are equal to policy elasticities. The general analysis in Proposition 6 provides
further insights by characterizing the necessary adjustments when some policy instruments are
freely adjustable.
4 Applications
In this section, we present four specific applications of our general results. This section has several
purposes. First, the study of these applications allows us to show how our results can be employed
to determine the optimal second-best policy in several scenarios of practical relevance. Second,
these applications, which are special cases of the general framework studied in Sections 2 and 3,
illustrate how our results encompass widely studied rationales for regulation, including bailouts,
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pecuniary externalities, and internalities.19 Third, by studying specific applications, we can connect
leakage (and policy) elasticities and Pigouvian wedges to model primitives. Finally, we discuss how
our results can be used to interpret existing empirical findings and guide future measurement efforts
in the context of each application.
Table 1 provides a schematic summary of our applications. Each application is designed to be
the simplest one that illustrates the form of the optimal second-best policy in a particular second-
best scenario. In the Online Appendix, we provide detailed derivations for each application.20
Table 1: Summary of Applications
Application Restricted Instrument |I| |X |
#1 Shadow Banking Unregulated Investors 2 1
#2 Scale-Invariant Regulation Unregulated Activities 1 2
#3 Asset Substitution Uniform Activity Regulation 1 2
#4 Heterogeneous Fire-Sale Externalities Uniform Investor Regulation 2 1
In Application 1, we study a model of shadow banking in which some banks/investors are
unregulated and regulation is motivated by the presence of implicit government subsidies to
traditional and shadow banks. In Application 2, we study an environment where regulation
constrains the ratio of investors’ risky investments to borrowing. Such scale-invariant regulations
form a large part of financial regulatory policy in practice. In this application, to illustrate how
our model applies to a different rationale for intervention, we consider a behavioral distortion
(distorted beliefs). In Application 3, regulation is constrained to be uniform across different
investment activities, with intervention motivated by government bailouts, which gives rise to an
asset substitution problem. In the final application, we analyze a model of fire-sale externalities,
along the lines of Lorenzoni (2008), in which regulation is also constrained to be uniform across
different types of investors.
4.1 Application 1: Shadow Banking/Unregulated Investors
The notion of shadow banking is typically used to describe the financial activities that take place
outside of the regulated financial sector.21 In this application, we consider an environment with
two types of investors, in which only one type of investor can be regulated (the traditional sector),
while the other is outside of the scope of the regulation (the shadow sector).
19Note that our formulation of investors’ and creditors’ preferences in Equations (1) and (4) is more general than
it may seem since, as we show in this section, there is no need to write an explicit representation of investors’
and creditors’ preferences to study the welfare implications of first-best and second-best regulation under different
rationales for intervention.
20These applications are not exhaustive. For instance, one could study the role of imperfect corrective regulation in
models of strategic behavior and imperfect competition, as in Corbae and D’Erasmo (2010) and Corbae and Levine
(2018, 2019), or in the context of regulation of asset markets, as in Dávila (2014) or Cai, He, Jiang and Xiong (2020).
21Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky (2010), Gorton, Metrick, Shleifer and Tarullo (2010), and Claessens, Pozsar,
Ratnovski and Singh (2012) provide a detailed overview of shadow banking institutions, activities, and regulations.
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Environment We assume that there are two types of investors i ∈ {1, 2}. In this application,
investors should be broadly interpreted as financial intermediaries or banks. Investors have risk-
neutral preferences of the form:
ci0 + βi
ˆ
ci1 (s) dF (s) ,
with budget constraints given by




− τ ibbi + T i0









At date 0, an investor i endowed with ni0 dollars chooses the face value of its debt, bi, which




, determined in equilibrium by
creditors, as described below. Investor i faces a corrective tax τ ib per unit of bi due at date 0. At
date 1, once a state s is realized, investor i receives vis dollars, as well as a bailout transfer that





of bailouts corresponds to a model where the government has limited commitment, which connects
our work to the treatment of bailouts in Farhi and Tirole (2012), Bianchi (2016), Chari and Kehoe
(2016), Keister (2016), Gourinchas and Martin (2017), Cordella, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2018),
Dávila and Walther (2020a), and Dovis and Kirpalani (2020), among others.





− bi < 0, and to repay otherwise. After default, creditors receive a fraction φi of the
gross returns to investment — the remainder 1− φi measures the deadweight loss associated with
default — and any bailout funds.












Their budget constraints are given by



























received by creditors from investor i in state s, explicitly described in the Online Appendix. At
date 1, all bailout funds are raised from creditors, with a constant net marginal cost of public funds
κ ≥ 0. Note that investors only interact in this application through changes in the price of credit,

















Figure 1: Shadow Banking/Unregulated Investors (Application 1)
Note: Figure 1 compares the marginal welfare effects of varying corrective regulations in two different scenarios. The
green dashed line corresponds to the first-best scenario in which the horizontal axis corresponds to τb = τ1b = τ2b .
The solid blue line corresponds to a second-best scenario in which τ2b = 0 and the horizontal axis corresponds to τ1b .
Since we assume that both types of investors are symmetric, the value of τb that makes the first-best marginal welfare
effect zero defines the first-best regulation. The value of τ1b that makes the second-best marginal welfare effect zero





= αi0−αiss+αibbi, and that creditors’ utility is isoelastic: u (c) = c
1−γ
1−γ . The parameters used to generate this
figure are βi = 0.7, φi = 0.25, vi = 1, αi0 = αis = 0, αib = 0.02, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Also κ = 0, γ = 4, βC = 0.98, nC0 = 50,
and nC1 (s) = 50 + 0.1s, where s is normally distributed with mean 1.3 and standard deviation 0.3, truncated to
the interval [0, 3]. For reference, the optimal first-best regulation is 4.88%, while the optimal second-best regulation,
when the second type of investors cannot be regulated, is 4.39%. Since borrowing decisions are gross substitutes in
this application, the optimal second-best policy is sub-Pigouvian.




































, such that investors
maximize their utility, given the financing schedules, and creditors set the schedules optimally,
so that h1 = h2 = 1.
In the first-best scenario, the planner is able to set τ1b and τ2b freely. However, we are interested
in scenarios in which the planner cannot regulate type 2 investors, so
τ2b = 0,
which makes the problem of choosing the optimal τ1b a second-best problem.
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Optimal Corrective Policy/Simulation First, in Proposition 7, we characterize the form of
the optimal second-best policy. Next, we explore a numerical simulation of this application,
Proposition 7. [Shadow Banking/Unregulated Investors]














where the marginal distortions in this application are defined by








dF (s) , (26)
where mC (s) denotes the stochastic discount factor of creditors.
b) The optimal corrective regulation satisfies









Proposition 7 is the counterpart of Propositions 3 and 5 and exploits the structure of this
application to extract further insights. In this application, the marginal distortions associated with
borrowing, δib, are determined by the expected marginal bailout
∂ti(bi,s)
∂bi
, augmented by default
deadweight losses κ if present, valued using the creditors’ stochastic discount factor. The departure




the unregulated distortion δ2b . As we show in the Online Appendix, in this application, consistent
with the empirical literature, we find that tighter regulation on the regulated sector (higher τ1b )
increases the activities carried out by the unregulated/shadow sector ( db2
dτ1
b
> 0), so leverage choices
are gross substitutes. Therefore, we expect the optimal second-best policy to be sub-Pigouvian.22
Moreover, the presence of unregulated investors may exacerbate the welfare distortion δ1b
associated with regulated investors. Concretely, when unregulated investors receive bailouts in
state s, the marginal utility of creditors increases in this state due to taxation. In Equation (26),
this increases the distortion associated with marginal increases in regulated investors’ leverage. In
this sense, our results reconcile two common narratives. On the one hand, leakage to the shadow
banking system motivates sub-Pigouvian regulation. On the other hand, the optimal corrective
policy must also adjust to increases in overall leverage, which raise marginal distortions δ1b in
22Note that one can also use this model to analyze quantity-based policies, such as capital requirements. For
instance, suppose that regulated investors are subject to a binding quantity regulation b1 ≤ b̄1, where the



















, and the optimal corrective regulation in
Proposition 7 can be alternatively expressed as






An instructive special case, which we use to solve the model numerically, is obtained by using




= αi0 − αiss + αibbi, where αis, αib ≥ 0. In this case,
marginal distortions δib = 1+κRf α
i
















mC (s) dF (s)
)−1
denotes the creditors’ riskless discount rate.
Figure 1 illustrates the comparison between the first-best and second-best policy when
simulating this model.23 To more clearly illustrate the insights that we present in this paper, in
Figure 1 we assume that both types of investors are ex-ante identical, and that the only difference
between the two is that investor 2 cannot be regulated. Given this symmetry assumption, it is
possible to represent the marginal value of varying the regulation τb = τ1b = τ2b for both investors,
which yields the first-best regulation when dWdτb = 0.
In contrast, the solid line in Figure 1 shows the marginal value of varying the regulation that
investor 1 faces (the traditional sector), when investor 2 (the shadow sector) is unregulated, that




> 0 and db1
dτ1
b
< 0, we find that the
optimal second-best policy is sub-Pigouvian, so the optimal second-best regulation that investor
1 faces is lower than the first-best regulation. In this particular simulation, the optimal first-best
regulation is τ1b = τ2b = 4.88%, while the second-best regulation (when τ2b = 0) is τ1b = 4.39%.24
4.2 Application 2: Scale-Invariant Regulation/Unregulated Activities
In practice, it is common for regulators to impose constraints on ratios of investors’ liabilities to
risky assets, while leaving the overall scale of risky investment as a free, unregulated choice.25 In
this application, we characterize the form of the optimal scale-invariant policy in a model in which
regulation is motivated by belief distortions.
23Figure OA-1 in the Online Appendix illustrates comparative statistics of different endogenous outcomes of the
model that are useful to better understand the form of the optimal second-best policy. Figures OA-2 through OA-4
in the Online Appendix do the same for the remaining applications.
24Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski and Seru (2018a) and Irani, Iyer, Meisenzahl and Peydro (2021), among other recent
studies, directly quantify leakage elasticities between traditional and shadow banks. This work focuses on the elasticity
of substitution between the market share of regulated and unregulated investments. Due to space constraints, we
have held the scale of investment fixed in this application, but one could easily extend the framework to account for
both leverage and investment choices, in which case the measured elasticities of substitution in those papers become
directly relevant. In addition, our application highlights that the elasticity of substitution between regulated and
unregulated leverage is a key statistic for second-best regulation.
25It is possible to justify this assumption, for example, because the private sector has superior information about
investment opportunities (e.g., Walther, 2015). Perhaps for this reason, many relevant regulatory constraints in
practice (e.g., capital requirements, leverage limits, liquidity coverage ratios, and net stable funding requirements
in Basel III) focus on ratios of financial institutions’ assets to liabilities. Similarly, household finance regulations
are based on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios. All of these regulatory tools leave the scale of investment
unconstrained.
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Figure 2: Scale-Invariant Regulation/Unregulated Activities (Application 2)
Note: Figure 2 compares the marginal welfare effects of varying the corrective regulation in two different scenarios.
The green dashed line corresponds to a scenario in which τ ik is set at the first-best level. The solid blue line corresponds
to a second-best scenario in which τ ik = 0. Therefore, the value of τ ib that makes the first-best marginal welfare effect
zero defines the first-best leverage regulation, since τ ik is already set at the first-best level. The value of τ ib that makes
the second-best marginal welfare effect zero defines the second-best regulation. To generate this figure, we assume







)2. The parameters used to generate this figure are βi = 0.9,
βC = 0.95, φi = 0.8, and a = 1. We assume that investors and creditors perceive s to be normally distributed
with mean 1.5 and standard deviation 0.4, and the planner perceives the mean to be 1.3 instead. For reference,
the optimal first-best regulation is given by τ ib = 3.48% and τ ik = 18.5%, while the second-best regulation, when
investment cannot be regulated, is τ ib = 4.31%. Since leverage and investment decisions are gross complements in
this application, the optimal second-best policy is super-Pigouvian.
Environment We assume that there is a single type of investor, in unit measure and indexed by
i, and a unit measure of creditors, indexed by C. Both investors and creditors have risk-neutral
preferences, respectively given by
ci0 + βi
ˆ
ci1 (s) dF i (s) and cC0 + βC
ˆ
cC1 (s) dFC (s) ,
where F i (s) and FC (s) respectively denote the beliefs (cumulative distribution functions) of
investors and creditors over the possible states.
The budget constraints of investors at date 0 and date 1 are given by








− τ ibbi − τ ikki + T i0





At date 0, investors, endowed with ni0 dollars, choose how much to invest and borrow. An investment
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is a convex adjustment





unit of investment, which is determined by creditors in equilibrium. Therefore, the total face value




ki, and an investor’s
leverage ratio is simply bi. Investors face corrective taxes τ ib and τ ik per unit of leverage and
investment, respectively. We allow for default, which is optimal for an investor whenever s−bi < 0.
After default, creditors receive a fraction φi of the gross returns to investment. The remainder
1− φi measures the deadweight loss associated with default.
Creditors’ budget constraints are simply given by














denotes the repayment received by creditors from investors in state s per unit of
investment, explicitly described in the Online Appendix. Creditors’ and investors’ endowments are
such that their consumption is never negative. Since creditors are risk-neutral, they simply value
investors’ debt breaking even in expectation.
We assume that the planner computes welfare using different probability assessments than
those used by investors and creditors to make decisions. This provides a corrective rationale for
intervention. As highlighted in Dávila and Walther (2020b) and Proposition 8 below, the rationale
for regulation is determined by the difference between private agents’ and the planner’s valuations




































where FP (s) denotes the probability distribution used by the planner to calculate welfare.
Equilibrium In this application, for given corrective taxes/subsidies
{





transfers T i0, an equilibrium is defined by an investment decision, ki, a leverage decision, bi, and a
default decision rule such that i) investors maximize their utility given Qi (·), and ii) creditors set
the schedule Qi (·) optimally, so that hi = 1.
In the first-best scenario, the planner is able to set τ ib and τ ik freely. However, in practice it
is common to impose regulation on ratios of assets to liabilities, leaving scale decisions — here
investment — unregulated. Formally, we are interested in scenarios in which the planner cannot
regulate investment, so
τ ik = 0,
which makes the problem of choosing the optimal τ ib a second-best problem.
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Optimal Corrective Policy/Simulation In Proposition 8, we characterize the form of the
optimal second-best policy, which we discuss along with a numerical simulation.
Proposition 8. [Scale-Invariant Regulation/Unregulated Activities]






































b) The optimal corrective regulation satisfies









Proposition 8 is the counterpart of Propositions 3 and 5, and it identifies the distortions
associated with leverage and investment the planner perceives. In this application, the welfare
distortion associated with leverage, δib, is driven by the difference in marginal valuations, while
the distortion associated with investment, δik, is driven by the difference in the level of valuations.








< 0, implying that leverage and investment are gross complements. As implied by our results
in Section 3, the optimal second-best regulation on leverage is super-Pigouvian.
Importantly, a comparison between this application with the previous one (shadow banking)
highlights that both leakage elasticities featuring substitutes and those featuring complements are
important in common regulatory scenarios. A number of recent empirical studies confirm that the
leakage elasticity from leverage to risky investments is negative, in the sense that banks with lower
capital ratios originate a larger volume of risky loans (e.g., Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina,
2014; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Suarez, 2017; Acharya, Eisert, Eufinger and Hirsch, 2018).
Figure 2 compares the marginal welfare effects of varying regulation in the first-best and second-
best scenarios when simulating this model. To illustrate the first-best solution for leverage, we fix
τ ik to its first-best value when showing the marginal welfare associated with varying τ ib . The second-
best marginal welfare gain simply sets τ ik = 0. As implied by our theoretical results, the optimal
second-best policy is super-Pigouvian, so it is optimal for the planner to overregulate leverage
relative to the first-best scenario. In this particular simulation, the optimal first-best regulation is
τ ib = 3.48% and τ ik = 18.5%, while the second-best regulation (when τ ik = 0) is τ ib = 4.31%.
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Figure 3: Asset Substitution/Uniform Activity Regulation (Application 3)
Note: Figure 3 compares the marginal welfare effects of varying the corrective regulation in two different scenarios.
The green dashed line and the light blue dotted line illustrate the first-best regulation. The green dashed line
corresponds to a scenario in which τ2k is set at the first-best level, while the light blue dotted line corresponds to
a scenario in which τ1k is set at the first-best level. Therefore, the values of τ1k and τ2k that respectively make each
line zero define the first-best regulation. The solid dark blue line corresponds to a second-best scenario in which
τk = τ1k = τ2k , so its zero defines the second-best regulation. To generate this figure, we assume that the adjustment









)2 + z22 (ki2)2. We also assume that d1 (s) = µ1 + σ1s and d2 (s) = µ2 + σ2s
when s is distributed as a standard normal. The parameters used to generate this figure are βi = 0.8, βC = 1,
κ = 0.1, z1 = z2 = 1, bi = 1.4, µ1 = 1.5, µ2 = 1.3, σ1 = 0.3, and σ2 = 0.5. For reference, the optimal first-best
regulation is given by τ1k = 2.27% and τ2k = 0.39%, while the second-best regulation, when the regulation is uniform,
is τk = 1.33%.
4.3 Application 3: Asset Substitution/Uniform Activity Regulation
A common concern in financial regulation is that corrective policy instruments are somewhat coarse
in practice. For example, when imposing capital requirements on banks, financial regulators tend
to set risk weights for wide classes of risky investments (e.g., mortgage loans), but within the
class, banks can freely optimize their portfolios (e.g., among loans to borrowers with different
credit scores) without any change in the associated capital charge. In our model, this situation
corresponds to a uniform regulation across different capital investments. In this application, we
consider uniform corrective policy in a model where investors enjoy government guarantees. We
demonstrate that uniform regulation leads to a classical asset substitution problem (e.g., Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), and characterize the optimal second-best policy.
Environment We assume that there is a single type of investor, in unit measure and indexed by
i, and a unit measure of creditors, indexed by C. Both investors and creditors have risk-neutral
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preferences, respectively given by
ci0 + βi
ˆ
ci1 (s) dF (s) and cC0 + βC
ˆ
cC1 (s) dF (s) .
The budget constraints of investors at date 0 and date 1 are respectively given by






− τ1kki1 − τ2kki2 + T i0
ci1 (s) = max
{










At date 0, investors, endowed with ni0 dollars, choose the scale of two risky capital investments






. Hence, investors make |X | = 2
free choices regarding their balance-sheet.
At date 1, investors earn the realized returns on capital investments ki1 and ki2, which are given








from the government. We further assume that investors have legacy debt (i.e., debt
issued before the start of the model) with face value bi. Hence, investors owe a predetermined
repayment of bi to creditors at date 1. We make this simplifying assumption in order to sharpen
our focus on asset substitution, which describes investors’ choice between different risky investments,
as opposed to leverage choices. At date 1, investors consume the difference between i) the cash
flow from investments augmented by the bailout transfer and ii) the debt owed, if this difference is
positive. Otherwise, they default and consume zero.
For simplicity, we focus on a particular form of bailout that fully prevents default — this may
correspond to an investor that is “too big to fail”. Concretely, we assume that the government










bi − d1 (s) ki1 − d2 (s) ki2, 0
}
. (27)







for the threshold state below which bailouts are positive.26
Hence, the budget constraints of creditors at date 0 and date 1 are respectively given by
cC0 = nC0








Even though creditors are always repaid bi in every state, we assume that in order to finance
the bailout, the government imposes a tax of (1 + κ) per dollar of bailout on creditors, where
κ > 0 measures the deadweight fiscal cost of bailout transfers. The rationale for regulation in this
environment is a classical “moral hazard” argument. Investors, whose debt is implicitly guaranteed
by the government, do not internalize the impact of their risky capital investments on fiscal costs,
26Formally, for a fixed value bi of legacy debt, this threshold is the unique solution to bi − d1 (s) ki1 − d2 (s) ki2 = 0.
34
which ultimately reduces the consumption of creditors.














, and legacy debt bi, an equilibrium is defined by
investment decisions such that investors maximize their utility. In the first-best scenario, the
planner is able to set τ1k and τ2k freely. However, we are interested in a scenario in which the
planner is unable to treat investments differentially for regulation purposes. Thus, the planner
chooses τ1k ≥ 0 and τ2k ≥ 0 subject to the uniform regulation constraint:
τk = τ1k = τ2k .
Optimal Corrective Policy/Simulation In Proposition 9 we characterize the form of the
second-best policy, which we discuss along with a numerical simulation.
Proposition 9. [Asset Substitution/Uniform Activity Regulation]
a) The marginal welfare effect of varying the uniform corrective regulation of capital investments,







(τk − δ1) +
dki2
dτk
(τk − δ2) ,
where the marginal distortions in this application are defined by
δj = (1 + κ)βC
ˆ s?(ki1,ki2)
s
dj (s) dF (s) .




















Proposition 9 identifies the distortions associated with the different types of investment
decisions in this application. The shape of the distortions δj highlights the nature of the asset
substitution problem: investors’ private incentives are driven by the returns to investment in






, while the planner’s concern about bailouts focuses on “downside”






. The optimal uniform regulation is a weighted average of the downside
distortions imposed by both types of capital. As implied by our general results in Section 3, the
appropriate weight assigned by the planner to each of the distortions in the optimal second-best
















. Figure 3 illustrates this intuition by comparing the marginal welfare effects of varying
regulation in the first-best and second-best scenarios.
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In the Online Appendix, assuming that investment costs are quadratic, we provide further








are determined. We show that the sufficient statistics for
the optimal weights are i) the sensitivity of the probability of receiving a bailout to the uniform
regulation, and ii) the marginal contribution dn (s?) of each asset class at the bailout boundary.
Intuitively, a large ratio d2(s
?)
d1(s?) means that changes in the default boundary affect mostly returns to
ki2, which makes investors’ optimal investment in ki2 more sensitive to the uniform regulation.
4.4 Application 4: Heterogeneous Fire-Sale Externalities/Uniform Investor
Regulation
Pecuniary externalities coupled with incomplete markets and/or collateral constraints provide
a well-studied rationale for corrective financial regulation. The natural notion of efficiency in
those environments, constrained efficiency, typically requires individual-specific regulations. In this
application, we study the form of the second-best policy in an environment in which it would be
optimal to set investor-specific regulations, but the planner is constrained to set the same corrective
regulation for all investors.
Environment We assume that there are two types of investors/entrepreneurs, indexed by
i ∈ {1, 2}, and households, indexed by H — who in a richer model would also play the role of
creditors. There are three dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2} and no uncertainty.27 Investors, who for simplicity
do not discount the future, have preferences of the form:
ui = ci0 + ci1 + ci2,
subject to non-negativity constraints, ci0 ≥ 0, ci1 ≥ 0, ci2 ≥ 0, where their budget constraints are
given by
















. Investor i also faces a corrective tax τ ik per unit invested at date 0. At date 1,
an investor i faces a reinvestment need ξi > 0 per unit of invested capital at date 0, which needs
to be satisfied by selling ki0 − ki1 units of capital at a market price q — this is a simple way to
generate a fire-sale. At the final date, whatever capital is left yields an output ziki1. For simplicity,
we assume that, in equilibrium, T i0 = τ ikki0, ∀i.
Households, who exclusively consume at date 1, have access to a decreasing returns to scale
technology to transform capital into output at date 1. Formally, the utility of households is given
27It is well known that for pecuniary externalities to matter there must be more than one trading stage. The two
final dates in this application can be mapped to the second date in Section 2.
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Figure 4: Heterogeneous Fire-Sale Externalities/Uniform Investor Regulation (Application 4)
Note: Figure 4 compares the marginal welfare effects of varying the corrective regulation in two different scenarios.
The green dashed line and the light blue dotted line illustrate the first-best regulation. The green dashed line
corresponds to a scenario in which τ2k is set at the first-best level, while the light blue dotted line corresponds to
a scenario in which τ1k is set at the first-best level. Therefore, the values of τ1k and τ2k that respectively make
each line zero define the first-best regulation. The solid dark blue line corresponds to a second-best scenario in
which τ1k = τ2k = τk, so its zero defines the second-best regulation. To generate this figure, we assume that the


















. The parameters used to generate this figure are α = 0.5, a1 = a2 = 1, z1 = z2 = 1.5, ξ1 = 0.3,
and ξ2 = 0.4. For reference, the optimal first-best regulation is given by τ1k = 3.43% and τ2k = 4.57%, while the
second-best regulation, when the regulation is uniform, is τk = 3.99%.
by





where F (·) is a well-behaved concave function and kH1 denotes the amount of capital purchased
by households at date 1. The solution to the households’ problem will define a downward sloping
demand curve for sold capital at date 1.






























at dates 0 and 1, households’ capital allocation kH1 at date 1, and
an equilibrium price q, such that investors’ and households’ utilities are maximized, subject to







In the first-best scenario, the planner is able to set τ1k and τ2k freely. However, we are interested
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in scenarios in which the planner must regulate both investors equally, so
τk = τ1k = τ2k ,
which makes the problem of choosing the optimal τk a second-best problem.
In Section C of the Online Appendix, we provide a detailed characterization of the equilibrium.
At date 1, the non-negativity constraint of investors’ consumption will necessarily bind, so the









. When combined with market clearing and
with the characterization of optimal investment at date 0 that we present in the Online Appendix,


































Optimal Corrective Policy/Simulation In Proposition 10 we characterize the form of the
second-best policy, which we discuss along with a numerical simulation.
Proposition 10. [Fire-Sale Externalities/Uniform Investor Regulation]
a) The marginal welfare effect of varying the uniform corrective regulation of investments, τk =




















































Proposition 10 identifies the distortions associated with the investment choices of
investors/entrepreneurs. In this application, the distortion is generated by a distributive pecuniary
externality, using the terminology of Dávila and Korinek (2018). Consistent with the results in that
paper, this type of externality is determined by price sensitivities, in this case ∂q
∂ki0
; differences in
marginal valuations, in this case z`q − 1; and net trade positions, in this case k
`
0 − k`1. Note that δik
includes the sum of the latter two terms across both types of investors, since a given investor does
not internalize how his individual investment decision affects prices and consequently the welfare
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of other investors of the same and different types.
As implied once again by our general results in Section 3, the appropriate weight assigned by
the planner to each of the distortions in the optimal second-best policy is given by how sensitive
each capital decision is to changes in the regulation. Figure 4 illustrates this intuition by comparing
the marginal welfare effects of varying regulation in the first-best and second-best scenarios. By
comparing Application 3 with Application 4, it becomes evident that the principles that guide the
second-best regulation when it is forced to be uniform across choices for a given agent or across
agents for a given choice are identical.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a systematic study of optimal corrective regulation with imperfect instruments.
We have shown that leakage elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to account for
the marginal welfare impact of imperfect regulatory policies in a large class of environments. The
same statistics can also serve to characterize the social value of relaxing regulatory constraints. We
have characterized the optimal regulatory policy with unregulated investors, unregulated activities,
and with uniform regulation across heterogeneous investors and activities.
A central insight is that leakage elasticities from perfectly regulated to imperfectly regulated
activities play a crucial role in determining second-best policy. In particular, we show that
the optimal second-best policy depends crucially on whether perfectly and imperfectly regulated
decisions are gross substitutes or gross complements. Our work provides concrete examples of the
relevant elasticities, with the hope that they guide future measurement efforts. We have leveraged
the general methodology to highlight the common fundamental economic principles in a number
of practical scenarios, such as shadow banking, scale-invariant regulation, asset substitution, and
fire-sale externalities with heterogeneous investors.
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A Proofs and derivations: Section 2






































where λi0 and λi1 (s) denote the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to investor i’s budget constraints.28
The consumption optimality conditions imply that λi0 = ∂u
i
∂ci0





























dF (s) = 0, ∀i, (28)









∂xi , and τ














































































28Without loss of generality, we define the state s multipliers λi1 (s) inside the expectation.
















Creditors’ problem: The problem solved by creditors in Lagrangian form is
max
cC0 ,{cC1 (s)},{hCi }
LC ,





































where λC0 and λC1 (s) denote the Lagrange multipliers that correspond to the creditors’ budget constraints.
The consumption optimality conditions imply that λC0 = ∂u
C
∂cC0



















dF (s) = 0, ∀i, (29)
where we use the fact that xi = xi in equilibrium. Equation (29), which exactly corresponds to Equation










B Proofs and derivations: Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1 [Marginal Welfare Effects of Corrective Regulation: Policy
Elasticities and Pigouvian Wedges]:








, which correspond to the money-metric









































Investors. We express the financing schedules faced by investors as a function of the stochastic discount
factor of creditors mC (s), which is in turn in equilibrium a function of the consumption of creditors in
all dates and states. This allows us to separately account for any general equilibrium pecuniary effects.












where we make explicit the dependence on mC (s). The money-metric change in indirect utility for investor
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where the |X | × 1 vectors dT
i
0
dτ j and x




























and where the matrix dτ
i




I|X |, if i = j0|X |, if i 6= j,
which is either a |X |-dimensional identity matrix, I|X |, when i = j, or a |X |× |X | matrix of zeros, 0|X |, when
































































Note that we define the |X | × |X | matrix dx
i
























This matrix is the Jacobian of the equilibrium vector of the balance-sheet decisions of investor i with respect
to a change in the set of regulations that agent j faces. Note also that ∂u
i
∂x`
denotes a |X |×1 gradient vector.

















































































































∂xi , and where
the |X | × 1 vector ∂ρ
C
i













dτ j is defined as in Equation (30), and that
∂uC
∂x`
denotes a |X | × 1 gradient vector.



























































































































































which, after being stacked, corresponds to Equation (17) in the text — see also Footnote 9. Note that δi is
a |X | × 1 vector.
Proof of Proposition 2 [First-Best Regulation/Pigouvian Principle]:




which defines a system of homogeneous linear equations in ω. If the matrix of policy elasticities dxdτ is
invertible (i.e., has full rank), the only solution to this system is the trivial solution ω = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 [Second-Best Regulation: General Case]:
Proof. Note that the Jacobian matrix dx
R
dτU























, with dimensions |U| × |U|, |R| × |U|, and |R| × |R| respectively, by switching the sets of
coefficients.
Consider the marginal welfare effects of increasing the perfectly regulated taxes/subsidies τR. By
definition of the perfectly regulated activities, we have ηR = 0, so that Equation (18) yields dW
dτR
= 0




















Assuming that the matrix dx
R
dτR




























Derivations with diagonal policy elasticities: When the own-regulatory policy elasticity matrix
dxR
dτR
















































































































It follows that the second-best regulation on choice (j, n) ∈ R is given by













Proof of Proposition 4 [Welfare effects of relaxing regulatory constraints]:
Proof. Using Equation (17) (or, more directly, its expanded version in Footnote 9) we obtain the welfare
















From the characterization of τR at the second-best optimum from Proposition 3, we have that

























































Proof of Proposition 5 [Second-Best Regulation: Unregulated Investors/Activities]:
Proof. This proposition follows directly from Proposition 3 and the observation that, at the second-best
optimum, the constraints are binding with τU = 0. Concretely, we have


















Proof of Proposition 6 [Second-Best Regulation: Imperfect Targeting]:
Proof. Given the constraints specified in the text for this case, we can write the Lagrangian for the optimal
second-best policy as








where, without loss of generality, we have re-indexed the set U =
{
(j, n) ∈ |X | : ηjn 6= 0
}
using the auxiliary


















(µu − µu−1)− µ|U|−1 = 0,





























where the last line uses the fact that all elements of τU must be equal to the same scalar, denoted τU , at




(I −L) ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
scalar
τU = ι′ dx
U
dτU














Section C of this Online Appendix includes detailed proofs and derivations associated with the four
applications described in Section 4 of the paper. Section D of this Online Appendix shows that the results
of the paper apply unchanged to a classical consumer theory scenario.
C Proofs and derivations: Section 4
C.1 Application 1




−bi < 0.30 Assuming
that vi + ∂t
i(bi,s)

























































We further assume that creditors have constant relative risk aversion with coefficient γ.









. Substituting creditors’ budget constraints into their objective, we obtain the simplified version



































where V C (·) denotes creditors’ indirect utility as a function of investors’ debt choice and market prices.


















mC (s) bidF (s) .
Note that the stochastic discount factor in equilibrium must satisfy the fixed-point equation























30Note that it is straightforward to make bailouts depend on the decisions of all investors, as in, e.g., Farhi and
Tirole (2012).
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Figure OA-1: Application 1: Second-Best Comparative Statics
Note: Figure OA-1 illustrates relevant comparative statics of Application 1 for different values of τ1b , when τ2b = 0.
The top left plot shows equilibrium borrowing bi for both types of investors. The top right plot shows the equilibrium
creditors’ riskless rate, defined on page 29. The middle left plot shows the distortion associated with the borrowing
choice of each investor, δ1b and δ2b , defined in Equation (31) — note that the distortions move inversely with changes
in the riskless rate Rf and quantitatively the changes are small. The middle right plot shows the Pigouvian wedge








> 0. The parameters used are described in Figure 1.
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Investors’ optimal choices: Substituting investors’ budget constraints into their objective, and
ignoring exogenous endowments, we obtain the simplified version of their maximization problem:
V i
(






















− τ ibbi + T i0,
where V i (·) denotes investors’ indirect utility as a function of regulation and market prices. The first-order





















































Marginal welfare effects: The money-metric marginal welfare effects of changing the regulation τ jb of

















, since λi0 = 1. Using an envelope argument parallel to our general results in Proposition
1, we obtain, abstracting from pecuniary effects that cancel after aggregating,
dV C
dτ jb








































It follows that the first-best policy must satisfy τ ib = δib, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Proposition 7 [Shadow Banking/Unregulated Investors]:
Proof. The proposition follows directly by evaluating Equation (31) in the case where the planner is forced
to set τ2b ≡ 0.
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Further simulation results: Figure OA-1 illustrates comparative statics of the model in the context
of the second-best policy, in which τ2b = 0.
C.2 Application 2
Default and repayments: At date 1, investors optimally decide to default when s < bi, and to repay




















Creditors’ optimal choices and asset pricing: Since creditors are risk-neutral, they must be
indifferent between all quantities of debt purchase in equilibrium. Hence, the valuation of debt per unit of














Investors’ optimal choices: Substituting the valuation of debt and the budget constraints into

































We assume that all corrective taxes/subsidies are reimbursed to investors with T i0 = τ ibbi + τ ikki. The first-


































As shown in Dávila and Walther (2020b), assuming that 0 < βi < βC ≤ 1 and that φ is not too small
guarantees an interior solution for leverage. Note that when τ ib = 0, the equilibrium value of bi is independent
of ki, and consequently of τ ik. This explains why the first-best and second-best marginal values of regulating




















Marginal welfare effects: As shown by Dávila and Walther (2020b), social welfare for a planner who

























dF i,P (s) + βC
(ˆ s
bi






The marginal welfare effects of varying τ ib , after differentiating and substituting investors’ first-order













































τ ik − (M (bi)−MP (bi))︸ ︷︷ ︸
δi
k
 dkidτ ib . (34)
Proof of Proposition 8 [Scale-Invariant Regulation/Unregulated Activities]:
Proof. The proposition follows directly by evaluating Equation (34) in the case where the planner is forced
to set τ ik ≡ 0.
Further simulation results: Figure OA-2 illustrates comparative statics of the model in the context
of the second-best policy, in which τ ik = 0.
C.3 Application 3
Default and repayments: The bailout policy specified in Equation (27) implies that investors always
(weakly) prefer not to default. Creditors are therefore guaranteed a repayment equal to the face value of
legacy debt, bi. We treat bi as an exogenous constant throughout this application. The threshold state below
























Notice that this equation has a unique solution because we have assumed that the returns to investment,
d1 (s) and d2 (s), are increasing in s.
Creditors’ optimal choices and asset pricing: In this application, we assume for simplicity that
investors’ debt bi is legacy debt, i.e., issued before the start of the model. Therefore, there is no market for
debt, and no market price, at date 0. Creditors are passive agents who simply consume their endowments
and debt repayments, and pay the taxes raised for bailouts. Creditors’ indirect utility, as a function of
OA-5










































































Figure OA-2: Application 2: Second-Best Comparative Statics
Note: Figure OA-2 illustrates relevant comparative statics of Application 2 for different values of τb, when τk = 0.
The top left plot and the top middle-left plot show equilibrium leverage b and investment k. The top middle-right
and right plots show the leverage distortion δb and the capital distortion δk, respectively. The bottom left plot and
the bottom middle-left plot show the associated Pigouvian wedges, ωb and ωk, respectively. The bottom middle-right
plot and bottom right plot show the policy elasticity db
dτb
and the leakage elasticity dk
dτb
. The parameters used are
described in Figure 2.
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Investors’ optimal choices: Substituting investors’ budget constraints into their objective, and


































denotes investors’ indirect utility as a function of taxes/subsidies.
























− τ2k = 0.
Marginal welfare effects: The marginal welfare effect of changing the regulation τ jk of investment










Using the envelope theorem, parallel to our general results in Proposition 1, we obtain
dV C
dτ jk



































τm − (1 + κ)βC
ˆ s?(ki1,ki2)
s




Proof of Proposition 9 [Asset Substitution/Uniform Activity Regulation]:






































































































































































































Applying the implicit function theorem and Leibniz rule to investors’ first-order conditions, and imposing

























































)) ds? (ki1, ki2)
dτk
.


















It follows that the sufficient statistics for leakage elasticities are i) the scaling factor zn of the cost function,
ii) the sensitivity of the probability of bailout to the regulation, and iii) the marginal contribution dn (s?)


























































1 + βid2 (s?)
dP(ki1,ki2)
dτk




Further simulation results Figure OA-3 illustrates comparative statics of the model in the context
of the second-best policy, in which τk = τ1k = τ2k .
C.4 Application 4
Households’ optimal choices and asset pricing: Households’ optimization problem at date 1 can
be expressed as







where V H (·) denotes households’ indirect utility as a function of market prices. The solution to the









= kH1 , we find the following equation, which the price q must satisfy:


























































Figure OA-3: Application 3: Second-Best Comparative Statics
Note: Figure OA-3 illustrates relevant comparative statics of Application 3 for different values of τk = τ1k = τ2k .
The top left plot shows the default threshold s?. The top right plot shows risky capital investments ki1 and ki2. The
middle left plot shows the distortions associated with each investment decisions, δ1 and δ2, and the middle right plot







. The parameters used are described in Figure 3.
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Notice that this equation defines q as an implicit function of capital investments ki0. Below, we derive a
solution for the equilibrium value of q in terms of primitives under standard functional forms.
Investors’ optimal choices: We solve investors’ problem recursively. At date 1, the non-negativity






















































− τ ikki0 + T i0
}
,
where V i (·) denotes investors’ indirect lifetime utility as a function of taxes and market prices. The first-


























Marginal welfare effects: The marginal welfare effect of changing the regulation τ jk of investor type












































































































































































Proof of Proposition 10 [Fire-Sale Externalities/Uniform Investor Regulation]:
Proof. With uniform taxation, the planner is forced to set τk = τ1k = τ2k . The marginal welfare effect of












































α , which implies that F
′ (kH1 ) =(
kH1













































− τ ik > 0 is required for ki0 > 0. Combining the

















As expected, the same change in ki0 has a stronger impact on the price at date 1 for those investors with a
higher ξi, who are forced to sell more at date 1. Note that we can write ∂q
∂ki0
= ξi α−1α q
1
1−α , so ∂q
∂ki0
is higher
in absolute, when q is higher.
Further simulation results Figure OA-4 illustrates comparative statics of the model in the context
of the second-best policy, in which τk = τ1k = τ2k .
D Classical Consumer Theory Formulation
In this section, we show that Proposition 1 holds unchanged in the context of classical consumer theory
after suitably reinterpreting some of the variables. Since the remaining propositions in the body of the
paper follow from Proposition 1, showing that Proposition 1 holds unchanged in a classical consumer theory
scenario is sufficient to establish that all other results are also applicable in that case. Here, we follow closely
the notation in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995).
Environment There is a finite number of consumer types, indexed by i, j,m ∈ I, where I = {1, 2, . . . , I}.
There are L different commodities, indexed by `. The preferences of a type i consumer are represented by










where xi ∈ RL denotes the consumption bundle of a type i consumer. As in Section 2, we denote by xj ∈ RL
the consumption bundles of type j consumers as a whole.





≤ wi − τ i · xi + T i0, (38)
where p ∈ RL is the vector of commodity prices, ei ∈ RL is the endowment in terms of the different
commodities of a type i consumer, wi is the wealth of a type i consumer, and τ i ∈ RL and T i0 are
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Figure OA-4: Application 4: Second-Best Comparative Statics
Note: Figure OA-4 illustrates relevant comparative statics of Application 4 for different values of τ1k = τ2k = τk. The
top left plot shows the price of capital in equilibrium q. The top middle plot shows investment at date 0 for both
investor types, k10 and k20. The top right plot shows the amount of capital sold at date 1 for both investor types,
k10 − k11 and k20 − k21. The bottom left plot and the bottom middle plot show the distortions associated with the
investment decisions of each investor, δ1k and δ2k, and the associated Pigouvian wedges, ω1k and ω2k. The bottom right








. The parameters used are described in Figure 4.
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the (potentially consumer-type specific) taxes/subsidies and the transfer received by a type i consumer,
respectively. As a whole, the transfers must satisfy∑
i∈I

















i∈I and prices p, such that i) investors maximize utility, Equation (37), subject
to budget constraint (38), ii) any revenue raised is returned back to investors, satisfying Equation (39), iii)






= 0, and iv) consumption allocations are consistent in the aggregate,
that is, xi = xi, ∀i.
Result Here we provide the counterpart of Proposition 1 in the text. As in Section 3, welfare is computed
in money-metric terms.
Proposition 11. [Marginal Welfare Effects of Corrective Regulation: Classical Consumer Theory] The





(τ − δ) = dx
dτ
ω, (40)
where dWdτ is a vector of dimension L·I×1,
dx
dτ is the square Jacobian matrix of policy elasticities of dimension









































Proof. First, we characterize the change in indirect utility of consumer-type i when varying the vector of



































































dτ j , and
dτ i
dτ j as L × L Jacobians and
∇xui (·), ∇xui (·), and dT
i
0
dτ j as L× 1 gradient vectors. Note that
dV i





dτ j indistinctly going forward, since they are equal in equilibrium.
















































































= 0, and the fact that








































so Equation (40) follows immediately after stacking.
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